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ABSTRACT 
The contagion of financial crises surrounding the markets around the world has been in the forefront of academic and 
public discussions. In this paper, we attempt to study the “contagion effect” of the stock market crises around the world 
by studying the correlations of global stock returns and volatility. We analyze the daily returns of major stock indexes 
around the world to discover the timing and path of the transmission of shocks that manifest themselves in stock market 
returns. We construct VARs of major stock market index returns and volatilities. Our work differs from the literature in 
analyzing spillover effects between emerging markets and other major stock markets. 
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1. Introduction 
The contagion of financial crises surrounding the markets 
around the world has been in the forefront of academic 
and public discussions due to the experiences of Mexico 
in 1994, Indonesia, Japan and other Asian countries in 
1997 and 1998, Russia in 1998, and Brazil in 1999. In all 
these cases, a number of countries experienced increased 
volatility and co-movement of asset prices in the after- 
math of a dramatic movement in one stock market. Al- 
though greater volatility is expected during a time of fi- 
nancial turmoil, economists have not been able to pro- 
vide a straightforward explanation for the co-movement 
of asset prices across countries, particularly among coun-
tries with no or very few economic links. 
The transmission of increased volatility and co-move- 
ment of asset prices after financial crises has been termed 
contagion. There are different definitions of contagion 
widely used in the literature. Contagion has both been 
defined as increased co-movement or increased linkages 
across markets after shocks. The former definition is 
broader and refers to increased co-movement of asset 
prices in times of high volatility as contagion. The latter 
definition entails the transmission of shocks to other 
countries beyond any fundamental link among the coun- 
tries and beyond common shocks and commonly ex- 
plained by herding behavior. Contagion occurs when 
cross-country correlations increase during crisis times re- 
lative to correlations during stable times. 
However, some economists also define contagion as 
the transmission of shocks to other countries. Contagion 
can take place both during “good” times and “bad” times  
and therefore does not need to be related to crises. How- 
ever, contagion has been emphasized during crisis times. 
Yet, some economists argue that the transmission me- 
chanism of shocks distinguish contagion from interde- 
pendence [1]. Among economists who agree on the defi- 
nition of contagion, there may be disagreement as to how 
to measure contagion. Linkages among markets can be 
measured as the correlation in asset returns of the prob- 
ability of a speculative attack. 
In this paper, we will define contagion as increased 
linkages after a shock. We provide empirical evidence 
for the existence of contagion during the Asian crises. 
We will first model the linkages among the first impor- 
tant stock markets and we treat these results as reflecting 
the economic links between countries in stable times. 
Next we study correlations among markets to identify 
cases where contagion could be said to have occurred. 
We use the term “contagion effect” as the impact of 
the shock in one market on another market. Although 
each crisis can be analyzed and to some extent explained 
using detailed country-specific data, a possible “conta- 
gion effect” necessitates a broader perspective. Conse- 
quently, in this paper we attempt to study the “contagion 
effect” of the stock market crises around the world by 
studying the correlations of global stock returns and vo- 
latility. We analyze the daily returns of major stock in- 
dexes around the world to discover the timing and path 
of the transmission of shocks that manifest themselves in 
stock market returns. The methodology we adopt mini- 
mizes data requirements, which pose serious limitations 
on any empirical study that incorporates emerging mar- 
kets. 
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We will define contagion as the increased correlation 
during crisis periods and suggest ways to improve on the 
tests performed in the empirical literature. In the next 
section, the related literature is discussed, followed by a 
detailed description of the data and methodology em- 
ployed. The results pertaining to daily returns, weekly 
returns and volatility are discussed respectively. A sum- 
mary of major findings and directions for future research 
conclude the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
There exists a body of literature that looks at correlations 
of stock returns across stock markets. The common ap- 
proach is to look at returns on major stock market in- 
dexes in a bivariate setting and detect dependencies. Here 
we summarize this body of research. Reference [2] finds 
that international correlations are not stable over time, a 
finding that is also confirmed by [3,4] on monthly returns 
of industrial countries. In [5-7] the authors find that cor-
relations are higher in times of high volatility and [8] 
finds higher correlations in more recent years. Reference 
[9] studies the correlations of monthly excess returns for 
7 major countries over a thirty-year period and finds in-
creased correlations between markets over time. 
Our paper differs from the works mentioned above in 
two important ways. Firstly, our focus is the correlations 
between stock returns of not only industrialized countries 
but emerging markets as well. Secondly, we do not look 
at bivariate correlations as conducted in ([5,9]) but ana- 
lyze the linkages across several markets simultaneously. 
Furthermore, we focus on shorter-term linkages, namely 
daily and weekly rather than monthly1. Due to data limi- 
tations posed by the emerging markets we cannot extend 
our analysis to monthly returns without restricting our 
sample of countries. In the next section, the data and the 
methodology we employ are described in detail. 
3. Data/Methodology 
Using Bloomberg Historical Data provided by Bloom- 
berg LP, we study the daily returns on major stock in- 
dexes around the world in a theoretical vector auto-re- 
gression (VAR), which is a popular method of analyz- 
ing the dynamics of economic systems. The countries/ 
areas we study are the United States, the United King- 
dom, Germany, Spain, Russia, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, and 
Brazil. The sample consists of the following indexes: 
S&P 500 (SPX), British Financial Times 100 Index 
(UKX), Spanish 35 Index, formerly FIXE 35, (IBEX), 
Deutsche Borse AG German Stock Index (DAX), Rus- 
sian Trading System Index (RTSI$), Singapore’s Straits 
Times Index (STI), Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index (HIS), 
Japan’s Nikkei Dow (NKY), Indonesia’s Jakarta Com- 
posite Index (JCI), Mexican Bolsa (MEXBOL), Argen- 
tina’s Stock Index (MERVAL), Venezuela’s Stock Mar- 
ket Index (IBVC), and Brazil’s Bovespa (IBOV). The 
timeframe for the analysis is constrained by the deve- 
lopment of the Russian Trading System on September 1st, 
1995. 
In order to see the transmission of shocks across stock 
markets, we restrict lag length to 5 days. Longer lags 
improve forecasting ability of individual stock indexes 
but are costly in terms of degrees of freedom for the 
analysis of the system. We tested and rejected shorter 
lags. 








 y A y             (1) 
where yt is an n-vector of variables and sA  is an n × n 
matrix of coefficients. L denotes the total number of lags. 
εt is an n × 1 vector of errors that are uncorrelated across 
time, i.e.   0t t sE     . Let  t tE      . So in each 
equation there are n × L coefficients to be estimated, and 
in the system, there are n2L numer of coefficients. 
For computing future forecasts, the ordering in the 
VAR is important. We order the returns on stock market 
indexes by time. Our reasoning is that information in the 
stock markets travel relatively fast, with the markets in 
the US, reacting to news in Japan in a matter of hours. 
Since the data is based on returns calculated at the close 
of each day, any ordering that violates the time differ- 
ence in the stock markets will be missing an important 
component. 
As mentioned earlier, we use five lags (L = 5) of each 
variable. Including longer lags, up to twenty lags of each 
variable improves forecast accuracy but at the expense of 
clouding dynamics among different stock markets and 
greatly reducing degrees of freedom. Since our primary 
aim in this paper is to uncover the dynamics among 
world stock markets, we restrict the lag length to five. 
We test and reject shorter lags2. 
We initially started out with fourteen of the more im- 
portant world stock market indexes. Block exogeneity 
tests suggested that we exclude MERVAL, HSI, STI, 
IBEX, CAC and IBVC3. Below we present the results for 
an eight variable VAR with SPX, UKX, DAX, NKY, 
MEXBOL, IBOV, RTSI$, and JCI. 
4. Results 
In this section, the results from the VARs based on daily 
2This is done via likelihood ratio tests. Two VARs with different lags 
are estimated and their log likelihood values are compared with suitably 
correcting for sample size. 
3See footnote 2 above. 
1All the works we cite except for [5] are based on monthly returns and 
volatility. [5] study Thursday-to-Thursday weekly returns. 
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returns, weekly returns and weekly volatility are dis- 
cussed. First, we compute correlation coefficients in sta- 
ble times and crises periods based on two-country VARs. 
Later, we estimate VARs for major stock market indices 
based on daily and weekly returns. 
4.1. Correlation Coefficients 
This paper deals with the question of how to measure 
contagion, therefore, instead of providing a list of all its 
possible definitions and procedures to measure it, this 
paper concentrates on the two most frequently asked 
questions raised by applied papers in this area: 
First, what are the channels through which shocks are 
propagated from one country to another? In other words, 
is it the trade, macro similarities, common lender, learn- 
ing, or market psychology? What determines the degree 
of contagion? And second, is the transmission mecha-
nism stable over time? Or more specifically does it change 
during the crises? 
Providing the answer to any of the previous two ques- 
tions encounters important econometric limitations. Con- 
tagion has been associated with high frequency events; 
hence, it has been measured on stock market returns, 
interest rates, exchange rates, or linear combinations of 
them. This data is plagued with endogeneity, omitted 
variables, conditional and unconditional heteroskedastic- 
ity, serial correlation, non-linearity and nonnormality pro- 
blems. Unfortunately, there is no procedure that can han-
dle all these problems at the same time. And therefore, 
the literature has been forced to take short cuts. 
We will define contagion as the increased correlation 
during crises periods and suggest ways to improve on the 
tests performed in the empirical literature. Tests are 
based on simple correlation coefficients in stable and 
crises periods. 
If contagion is simply defined as increased co-move- 
ment after crises, then it is straightforward to test for 
contagion using correlation coefficients before and after 
crises. However, if we take a more restrictive approach 
and define contagion as increased correlation, then we 
need to make adjustments to our estimates of correlation 
coefficient because as [1] shows, the correlation coeffi- 
cient is biased upwards in times of high volatility. There- 
fore, tests for contagion should be based on correlation 
coefficients adjusted for this bias. 
However, the practical application of this adjustment 
is hampered by the low power of tests for contagion us- 
ing this method. Reference [10] demonstrates the low 
power of tests based on heteroskedasticity adjusted cor- 
relation coefficients and shows how these tests fail to 
find contagion in small samples while they do when cri- 
ses periods are defined to span longer periods that gener- 
ate larger samples for crisis episodes. A case could be 
made for extending the crises periods since contagion 
from a crisis in one country will affect other countries 
with lags, different lags for different countries. Hence 
extending the crisis episode can be defended. However, 
contagion is likely to take place with shorter lags, so we 
may still have a problem caused by small samples for 
crises periods in recent and future crises. 
Given this evidence, how can we test for contagion? 
Table 1 provides the cross correlations between Hong 
Kong and other countries’ major stock market indexes 
returns. The null hypothesis is that cross correlations are 
greater than zero during stable times as tested in column 
7 against the alternative that it is less than or equal to 
zero during crisis periods. The rejection of this hypothe- 
sis will constitute the evidence that the correlation coef- 
ficient is zero or less. 
We also tested the null that during crisis periods cor- 
relation coefficients are less than or equal to zero. The 
rejection of this hypothesis is evidence that there is a 
positive correlation between the two markets. Therefore, 
rejection of the two hypotheses indicates contagion. It is 
not necessary to perform this test on the correlation coef- 
ficients corrected for any potential bias since if the cor- 
relation coefficient is equal to zero in stable times, it will 
be true that it will be also equal to zero in volatile times. 
The sign will also carry over. So this particular test can 
be performed on unadjusted correlation coefficients. 
We subsequently cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
no or negative correlation during stable times for Taiwan, 
Thailand, Argentina, US and Russia. Additionally, we 
cannot reject the null of no or negative correlation in 
crisis times for Taiwan, Thailand, Mexico, US, India and 
South Africa. Therefore, we conclude that there was 
contagion from the shock to the Hong Kong stock market 
to the Russian market. 
As Table 2 shows, if we tested the null hypothesis to 
prove that the correlation coefficient is negative in stable 
times against the alternative that it is positive, and test 
the null that the correlation coefficient is positive in crisis 
times against the alternative that it is negative, rejections 
of both hypotheses indicates contagion since the sign of 
correlation coefficient will carry over. With this test, we 
identify contagion from stock market shocks in Hong 
Kong to the Brazilian, Mexican, Indian and South Afri- 
can stock markets. 
Based on the test results, we can also assert that there 
was no contagion from the Hong Kong crises to Taiwan, 
Thailand, Argentina and the US. The other countries 
have significant positive correlation in stable times and 
crisis times. Using the unadjusted correlation coefficients, 
we cannot determine whether there is contagion or not 
with a testing procedure that does not suffer from a low 
power. 
We have identified contagion as the linkage among 
stock markets in both stable times and times of crisis. 
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Table 1. Test results for contagion—stable (pre-crises-period) and crises period. 
 Stable Crises     
 rho stdev rho stdev  t-stat rho(stable) > 0 t-stat rho(crises) <= 0 
Indonesia 0.381 0.04 0.749 0.146 9.5250 NR (No-Rejection) 5.130 R (Rejection) 
Japan 0.231 0.044 0.559 0.229 5.2500 NR 2.441 R 
Korea 0.092 0.046 0.683 0.178 2.0000 NR 3.837 R 
Malaysia 0.28 0.043 0.465 0.261 6.5116 NR 1.7816 R 
Philippines 0.294 0.042 0.705 0.168 7.0000 NR 4.1964 R 
Singapore 0.341 0.041 0.493 0.252 8.3171 NR 1.9563 R 
Taiwan 0.01 0.046 0.149 0.326 0.2174 R 0.457 NR 
Thailand 0.046 0.046 0.402 0.279 1.0000 R 1.441 NR 
Argentina 0.03 0.046 −0.144 0.326 0.6522 R −0.442 NR 
Brazil 0.105 0.046 −0.593 0.332 2.2826 NR −1.786 NR 
Chile 0.144 0.045 0.619 0.206 3.2000 NR 3.005 R 
Mexico 0.238 0.044 0.241 0.314 5.4091 NR 0.768 NR 
Australia 0.356 0.04 0.865 0.084 8.9000 NR 10.298 R 
Belgium 0.14 0.045 0.714 0.163 3.1111 NR 4.380 R 
Canada 0.145 0.045 0.378 0.286 3.2222 NR 1.322 NR 
France 0.227 0.044 0.886 0.072 5.1591 NR 12.306 R 
Germany 0.383 0.039 0.902 0.062 9.8205 NR 14.548 R 
Italy 0.175 0.045 0.896 0.066 3.8889 NR 13.576 R 
The Netherlands 0.319 0.042 0.742 0.15 7.5952 NR 4.947 R 
Spain 0.191 0.045 0.878 0.076 4.2444 NR 11.553 R 
Sweden 0.233 0.044 0.796 0.122 5.2955 NR 6.525 R 
Switzerland 0.183 0.045 0.842 0.097 4.0667 NR 8.680 R 
UK 0.255 0.043 0.615 0.201 5.9302 NR 3.060 R 
US 0.021 0.046 −0.39 0.285 0.4565 R −1.368 NR 
India 0.097 0.046 0.024 0.333 2.1087 NR 0.0721 NR 
Russia 0.026 0.043 0.866 0.084 0.6047 R 10.310 R 
South Africa 0.368 0.04 0.052 0.092 9.2000 NR 0.565 NR 
 
The contagion between Russia and Hong Kong is inter- 
esting since we find no linkages between the two markets 
during stable times but observe co-movement of their 
asset returns during crisis. We use a portfolio balancing 
argument to explain why we observe changes in linkages 
during crisis times. It is conceivable that countries with 
no linkages in their market returns during stable times to 
exhibit and therefore experience co-movement of their 
stock market returns during the more volatile times where 
turmoil exists. 
4.2. Daily Returns 
Table 3 presents the significant coefficients in each of 
the equations in the VAR. Each column represents one 
equation in the system. Significant coefficients are 
marked with an X. We would like to remind the reader 
that five lags of each variable are included in each equa-  
tion. An X indicates that the coefficients for all the lags 
on that variable are found to be jointly significant at the 
10 percent level via an F-test. 
The strong interconnections between the stock markets 
of the industrialized world are apparent. The expected 
dependence of the Russian stock market on the German 
stock market is also reflected in the results. However, the 
DAX does not exhibit a similar dependence on the Rus- 
sian stock market in spite the high volume of German 
lending to Russia. 
The interdependence of the stock markets that have 
undergone turmoil in the recent past ISAN interesting 
finding. Brazilian stock market is found responsive to the 
Indonesian stock market but the effect seems to go only 
one way. The Japanese and Brazilian stock markets; The 
American and Indonesian stock markets exhibit strong 
mutual interdependence. 
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Table 2. Test results for contagion part ii—stable (pre-crises-period) and crises period. 
 Stable Crises     
 rho stdev rho stdev t-stat rho(stable) =< 0 t-stat rho(crises) > 0 
Indonesia 0.381 0.04 0.749 0.146 9.525 R 5.130 NR 
Japan 0.231 0.044 0.559 0.229 5.250 R 2.441 NR 
Korea 0.092 0.046 0.683 0.178 2.000 R 3.837 NR 
Malaysia 0.28 0.043 0.465 0.261 6.511 R 1.782 NR 
Philippines 0.294 0.042 0.705 0.168 7.000 R 4.196 NR 
Singapore 0.341 0.041 0.493 0.252 8.317 R 1.956 NR 
Taiwan 0.01 0.046 0.149 0.326 0.217 NR 0.457 R 
Thailand 0.046 0.046 0.402 0.279 1.000 NR 1.441 R 
Argentina 0.03 0.046 −0.144 0.326 0.652 NR −0.442 R 
Brazil 0.105 0.046 −0.593 0.332 2.282 R −1.786 R 
Chile 0.144 0.045 0.619 0.206 3.200 R 3.005 NR 
Mexico 0.238 0.044 0.241 0.314 5.409 R 0.768 R 
Australia 0.356 0.04 0.865 0.084 8.900 R 10.298 NR 
Belgium 0.14 0.045 0.714 0.163 3.111 R 4.380 NR 
Canada 0.145 0.045 0.378 0.286 3.222 R 1.322 R 
France 0.227 0.044 0.886 0.072 5.159 R 12.306 NR 
Germany 0.383 0.039 0.902 0.062 9.820 R 14.548 NR 
Italy 0.175 0.045 0.896 0.066 3.888 R 13.576 NR 
The Netherlands 0.319 0.042 0.742 0.15 7.595 R 4.947 NR 
Spain 0.191 0.045 0.878 0.076 4.244 R 11.553 NR 
Sweden 0.233 0.044 0.796 0.122 5.295 R 6.525 NR 
Switzerland 0.183 0.045 0.842 0.097 4.066 R 8.680 NR 
U.K. 0.255 0.043 0.615 0.201 5.930 R 3.060 NR 
U.S. 0.021 0.046 −0.39 0.285 0.456 NR −1.368 R 
India 0.097 0.046 0.024 0.333 2.108 R 0.072 R 
Russia 0.026 0.043 0.866 0.084 0.604 NR 10.310 NR 
South Africa 0.368 0.04 0.052 0.092 9.200 R 0.565 R 
 
Table 3. Significant coefficients. 
 Independent Variable 
Coefficients NKY JCI RTSI$ DAX UKX IBOV SPX MEXBOL 
NKY X X  X X X   
JCI  X    X X  
RTSI$   X     X 
DAX X X X X X    
UKX  X  X X  X  
IBOV X  X  X X   
SPX X X X X X    
MEXBOL  X     X  
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This table has implications for portfolio diversification. 
A shock to the NKY would have a significant effect on 
not only NKY, but also on JCI, DAX, UKX and IBOV 
since the NKY is a significant coefficient in JCI, DAX, 
UKX and IBOV. Suppose an investor expects the NKY 
to undergo a volatile period and wants to diversify away 
from the NKY. This in turn implies that JCI, DAX, UKX 
and IBOV are likely to be volatile due to the volatility in 
NKY. Funds should not only be diversified away from 
NKY but also away from these other indexes. This ar- 
gument is different from a standard portfolio diversifica- 
tion argument that recommends the inclusion of uncorre- 
lated stocks for diversification. Stocks may be correlated 
because their returns are governed by a similar set of 
fundamentals. A shock that affects the fundamentals 
would affect all the correlated stocks, but an idiosyn-
cratic shock in one of the indexes, would not. In the con-
text of a VAR, we can trace the effect of an idiosyncratic 
shock on the other indexes. In this sense, it is possible to 
make arguments for portfolio diversification that go be-
yond standard analysis. 
Figure 1 represents the above information in terms of 
links between stock markets. If the coefficients of market 
A are jointly significant in explaining stock market B’s 
behavior and vice versa, this is represented as a two-way 
link between A and B. If the effect goes only one way, a 
one-way link in the direction of the effect will summarize 
the interdependence. 
This figure is a useful aid for the impulse response 
charts in Figure 2. Impulse responses show the response 
of all stock markets to a one standard deviation shock in 
one of the markets. These shocks are orthogonalized 
shocks, i.e. they are shocks that only affect the stock 
market in question in the period that they occur. The 
VAR as stated in Equation (1) allows for dependence of 
errors in different equations. Indeed, there are global 
shocks that affect most if not all stock markets. Comput-
ing impulse responses for, say εt,i is not very useful if we 
believe that εt,i and εt,j are correlated. Impulse responses 
are computed for εt with the assumption that the other 
errors are zero which is violated in this case. The impulse 
responses presented are computed for idiosyncratic 
shocks, a shock particular to a stock market. Any shock, 
though as idiosyncratic as it may be, will be transmitted 
to other stock markets due to the interdependence that we 
are claiming. The impulse responses that we present 
show this transmission of idiosyncratic shocks, in econo- 
metric terms, shocks that are uncorrelated across equa- 
tions as well as being uncorrelated across time. We use 
the Choleski factorization to compute orthogonolized 
errors4. As an example, consider the responses to a one 











Figure 1. Interdependence among stock markets. 
 
MEXBOL will affect JCI and SPX. JCI will affect 
IBOV, SPX will affect RTSI$, NKY, DAX and UKX. 
The two-way link between RTSI$ and IBOV will exac-
erbate the initial effect before it dies out. Notice how the 
initial effect on JCI is large but dampens out very quickly 
despite the secondary effects from NKY, DAX, UKX 
and SPX. This is due to the low average volatility of 
these markets. Secondary effects from more volatile mar- 
kets tend to be substantial. Both IBOV and RTSI$ are 
volatile indexes so the secondary effects of a shock in 
MEXBOL are transmitted through JCI, another volatile 
index, that tends to be large. 
A similar story can be told of the responses to a one 
standard deviation positive shock to JCI. JCI affects 
IBOV, and through the two-way linkage between IBOV 
and RTSI$ which are both volatile indexes, also affects 
RTSI$ with one period delay. Notice that in the second 
period after the shock, the response in IBOV is high, 
compared with a very low response in RTSI$, but in the 
third period, the response in RTSI$ gets stronger, and 
remains strong until the responses die out in the seventh 
period. 
Table 4 presents the variance decompositions for the 
fifth period after the shock. Each row decomposes the 
variance of the 5-day forecast for the return one stock 
market index. The magnitude of the total variance is re- 
ported in the first column. Most of the variance in NKY, 
JCI, RTSI$ and IBOV forecasts are due to own shocks. 
Only the effect of shocks to UKX on NKY and IBOV are 
noteworthy. For the 5-day forecasts of the returns on the 
remaining stock markets, much if not most of the vari- 
ance is again due to their own shocks. Shocks to SPX 
have a significant effect on forecast of DAX and to a 
lesser extent on MEXBOL. Shocks to DAX explain half 
as much of the variance due to own shocks for UKX, 
only matched by the effect of IBOV on MEXBOL in the 
4A lower triangular matrix G that is the solution to GG’ = Ω is com-
puted and vt = utG−1 are used as the new shocks. 
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Figure 2. Impulse response functions (vertical axis) versus frequency in days (horizontal axis). 
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Table 4. Variance decompositions for 5-day forecasts. 
 Std Error NKY JCI RTSI DAX UKX IBOV SPX MEXBOL  
NKY 0.01 85.71 0.83 0.19 2.43 5.09 2.89 2.64 0.22 100 
JCI 0.02 2.99 84.98 1.62 1.99 2.76 2.19 2.28 1.17 100 
RTSI 0.04 1.32 1.13 89.29 0.24 1.50 3.91 1.88 0.73 100 
DAX 0.01 3.13 1.18 4.61 67.53 5.37 5.76 11.88 0.54 100 
UKX 0.01 5.44 1.10 4.17 25.54 53.88 4.54 4.85 0.47 100 
IBOV 0.03 1.42 0.60 3.70 5.52 5.09 81.88 0.80 1.00 100 
SPX 0.01 1.08 1.40 2.00 10.17 7.51 14.12 62.55 1.19 100 
MEXBOL 0.02 1.12 0.40 3.33 4.61 4.80 24.40 6.96 54.39 100 
 
system. It is surprising to note that NKY has such little 
effect on the other stock markets in the system. Shocks to 
NKY explain 5.5 percent of the variance of the 5-day 
forecast of UKX, but only 1 percent of the variance of 
the 5-day forecast in SPX. Shocks to JCI and MEXBOL 
have even less effect on the other markets in the system. 
These numbers suggest that to get good forecasts of 
DAX, UKX, SPX and MEXBOL, it is necessary to in-
clude information on other variables. A good forecast of 
SPX, for example, requires information on IBOV, DAX 
and UKX. 
4.3. Weekly Returns 
In the previous part, daily returns are employed to esti- 
mate contagion. The advantage is, most indexes respond 
to shocks within a month, or even a week’s time. How- 
ever, the cost of employing daily data is: confounding 
microstructure influences may be pretty large, including 
bid-ask bounce and non-synchronous trading (see refer- 
ence [11] Hou and Moskowitz, 2005, RFS). To provide a 
more comprehensive picture, we also look at weekly re- 
turns. Following [5], we compute Thursday-to-Thursday 
returns and compare our results with theirs. 
Table 5 presents the significant coefficients for week- 
ly returns. Two lags of each variable are included in each 
equation and an X indicates that the coefficients on both 
lags are jointly significant at the 10 percent level. 
Compared to the daily returns we see reduced interde- 
pendencies in world markets. The dependence of the 
Brazilian index on the Japanese index is preserved. A 
dependence of the British and the German indexes on the 
Indonesian and Russian indexes emerges. 
For longer-term portfolio diversification, this table gives 
more hope. It exhibits less correlation across time and 
among global markets. 
Table 6 presents the variance decompositions for the 
fifth period after the shock. As before, each row decom- 
poses the variance of the 5-week forecast for the return 
on the stock market index. The magnitude of the total 
variance is reported in the first column. The indirect ef- 
fects of all the markets are incorporated by the fifth week  
since we only include two lags in the regressions. As a 
result, we see a greater percentage of the variance being 
due to shocks in foreign stock markets. 
To get good forecasts of UKX, IBOV, SPX and MEX- 
BOL we need to include information on other variables. 
The NKY accounts for a substantial part of the variance 
of the 5-week forecast in all the other stock market re- 
turns in the system. 
To compare our results with those of [5] we do not 
find correlations among the US and Japan, and of the US 
and Germany. We confirm their finding that there is no 
correlation between the UK and the US. When we run 
bivariate VARS, we also find correlations between the 
US and Japan, and as well as the US and Germany. 
4.4. Weekly Volatility 
Table 7 presents the significant coefficients for weekly 
returns. Two lags of each variable are included in each 
equation and an X indicates that the coefficients on both 
lags are jointly significant at the 10 percent level. 
Weekly volatility seems to be transmitted among mar- 
kets. Notably, volatility in the US markets is affected by 
volatility in the Russian, Brazilian and Mexican mar- 
kets, as well as recent volatility in US markets. For emer- 
ging markets, domestic volatility overrides volatility in 
foreign markets. The exceptions are volatility in Ger- 
man markets for Brazil and Brazilian, Mexican and Bri- 
tish markets for Indonesia. 
Table 8 presents the variance decompositions for the 
fifth period after the shock. Each row decomposes the 
variance of the 5-week forecast for the return on the 
stock market index. The magnitude of the total variance 
is reported in the first column. The indirect effects of all 
the markets are incorporated by the fifth week since we 
only included two lags in the regressions. 
These numbers indicate that the volatility of UKX, 
IBOV, SPX, and MEXBOL are endogenous to the sys- 
tem. It would not be possible to get good forecasts of 
returns on these indexes by solely relying on their past 
values. The NKY represents a substantial portion of the 
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Table 5. Significant coefficients. 
Independent Variable 
Coefficients NKY JCI RTSI$ DAX UKX IBOV SPX MEXBOL 
NKY X     X   
JCI   X X X  X  
RTSI$    X X   X 
DAX         
UKX     X    
IBOV      X   
SPX         
MEXBOL   X      
 
Table 6. Variance decompositions for 5-week forecasts. 
 Std Error NKY JCI RTSI DAX UKX IBOV SPX MEXBOL  
NKY 0.03 92.60 1.59 0.14 1.86 0.13 1.44 1.32 0.91 100 
JCI 0.05 16.24 76.85 1.67 0.34 2.09 1.76 0.04 1.01 100 
RTSI 0.10 4.76 4.52 85.49 0.28 0.37 1.29 0.51 2.77 100 
DAX 0.03 8.78 8.39 6.06 72.08 0.73 1.54 0.37 2.05 100 
UKX 0.02 7.46 6.08 6.52 34.11 42.29 0.16 1.02 2.37 100 
IBOV 0.08 11.08 3.28 7.88 9.84 0.63 64.99 0.43 1.88 100 
SPX 0.02 10.47 5.08 6.79 26.66 8.78 5.87 35.24 1.11 100 
MEXBOL 0.04 8.45 0.88 11.50 10.35 1.09 25.75 1.29 40.70 100 
 
Table 7. Significant coefficients. 
 Independent Variable 
Coefficients NKY JCI RTSI$ DAX UKX IBOV SPX MEXBOL 
NKY X        
JCI  X       
RTSI$   X    X  
DAX    X X X  X 
UKX  X  X X    
IBOV  X    X X  
SPX       X  
MEXBOL X X     X  
 
Table 8. Variance decompositions for 5-week forecasts. 
 Std Error NKY JCI RTSI DAX UKX IBOV SPX MEXBOL  
NKY 0.11 88.63 1.08 1.01 4.36 0.78 0.10 0.61 3.43 100 
JCI 0.22 9.57 71.05 0.01 4.13 6.60 1.96 1.05 5.63 100 
RTSI 0.32 5.01 8.38 80.00 0.74 1.72 0.73 1.06 2.36 100 
DAX 0.12 8.39 2.73 2.98 74.77 6.04 0.57 0.77 3.75 100 
UKX 0.07 12.24 1.66 7.90 28.85 44.23 0.24 0.87 4.00 100 
IBOV 0.27 1.85 1.32 6.72 24.37 6.49 55.68 0.58 3.00 100 
SPX 0.09 4.52 1.58 9.28 25.60 3.47 3.46 46.15 5.94 100 
MEXBOL 0.16 5.03 5.33 10.01 27.57 2.96 14.82 5.78 28.50 100 
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forecast variance in the other stock markets. The return 
on DAX should be included in the forecasts of returns on 
UKX, IBOV, SPX, and MEXBOL, accounting for around 
one quarter of the 5-week forecast in each case. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we studied the global transmission of stock 
market shocks. We analyzed the daily and weekly returns 
on major stock market indexes, as well as weekly volati- 
lity. 
The daily returns on the Japanese stock market are 
impacted by daily returns on US, German, and Brazilian 
markets. They, in turn, influence daily returns on German, 
British, Brazilian and Indonesian markets. The US daily 
returns are found to be insensitive to daily returns on the 
Japanese stock market. 
The daily returns on US markets are found to be mov- 
ing in accordance with daily returns on Indonesian, Brit- 
ish and Mexican stock markets. British and German daily 
stock returns are linked to each other, as well as those of 
Japan and US markets. A similar link is observed for 
Japan, but does not hold for the US. 
Fewer dependencies are observed for Thursday-to- 
Thursday weekly returns. German and British weekly re- 
turns are influenced by weekly returns on Indonesian and 
Russian markets; Brazilian weekly returns are dependent 
on Japanese daily returns. These results demonstrate that 
emerging market returns influence returns on other stock 
markets, i.e. correlations between emerging and estab- 
lished market returns may be more important than corre- 
lations between major global stock market returns. Emer- 
ging markets are prone to large shocks, whose repercus- 
sions can be observed in other established markets. 
In our study we also look at the transmission of week- 
ly volatility. We measure volatility with the annualized 
standard deviation of weekly returns. Our results show 
that volatility in German and British markets have as 
wide repercussions as volatility in emerging markets. In 
general, linkages in daily or weekly returns are not pre-
served. The US market returns do not move together with 
daily or weekly returns in other markets but US market 
volatility is linked to volatility in the more volatile mar-
kets. 
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